



In a rare moment of self-restraint, I resolved not to bother to
write a comment to David Ratner's spirited but unconvincing reply
to my earlier article in the Cardozo Law Review.' Since Ratner's
response contained no defense whatsoever of the work of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), no criticism whatso-
ever of my general theory of agency obsolescence, and no theory of
its own to defend the SEC, it seemed to me at first that the best
course of action was to allow Ratner's reply to serve as its own
refutation.
But several things convinced me to craft this response. First,
when my article was first written and published, the idea of actually
eradicating a federal agency, as I suggested in the piece, seemed
entirely farcical. Bill Clinton was riding herd over a Democratic
Congress controlled by born-again regulatory zealots. But,
although Ratner seems blissfully unaware, the zeitgeist has
changed since the midterm elections in November 1994. Not only
are the Republicans in control of the House and the Senate, but
even Democrats are beginning to talk about "dismantling petrified
central bureaucracies and returning power from Washington to
states, communities and citizens."' 2 Since, in my view, the SEC eas-
ily qualifies as a petrified central bureaucracy that is undermining
the ability of citizens to engage in the critical pursuit of capital for-
mation, I thought I would use this opportunity to celebrate this
small glimmer of hope on the American political scene.
Another reason for crafting this brief rejoinder is because I
think that the Ratner rejoinder implicitly raises two interesting is-
sues of regulatory policy. And, because Ratner lacks the presci-
ence to understand the implications of his own analysis, I thought
that it would be a useful exercise to discuss the assumptions that
are embedded in his rejoinder. The first issue concerns burdens of
proof. As between Ratner and me, who should bear the burden of
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1 Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Forma-
tion: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 909 (1994).
2 Tom Brazaitis, Democrats Counter GOP "Contract," PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 6, 1994, at
10A.
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proof to demonstrate that the SEC is obsolete? Ratner, perhaps
subconsciously, assumes that I bear the burden of proof, and that,
because I have not proven that the SEC is obsolete (to his satisfac-
tion anyway), then I have lost our debate. But, as I will discuss in
more detail, I am not convinced that this assumption is correct.
A second assumption embedded in Ratner's analysis involves
a causal linkage between the existence of the SEC and the fact that
the United States has "the best securities markets in the world." 3
Like many apologists for the SEC, Ratner observes that the United
States has both a large government bureaucracy that regulates the
primary and secondary securities markets and excellent securities
markets. And on the basis of these two data points he concludes
that the former somehow has caused (or contributed to) the latter.4
From an analytical perspective this is like saying that fire trucks
must cause fires, because fire trucks appear on the scene whenever
there is a fire. The reason we have an SEC is because the United
States securities markets generate a lot of money. This pile of
money attracts politicians and bureaucrats, who can attract polit-
ical support and other benefits by regulating, or threatening to reg-
ulate, in this area.5 Thus the securities markets are like the fire in
my previous example. The SEC no more causes the securities mar-
kets in this country to be, great than fire engines cause fires.
II. MACEY'S LACK OF SELF-RESTRAINT
Of course, the real reason that I am writing this response is
because the Ratner rejoinder is such an easy target. And I lack the
self-restraint necessary to let readers determine for themselves
how vacuous his arguments are. (I am not a particularly successful
dieter, either.) But, after all, who could resist the opportunity to
wonder why Professor Ratner, a self-styled apologist for the SEC,
would care to point out that "[i]t may be that the SEC was already
obsolete the day it was created."'6 Well, excuse me for bringing old
news to the readers of the Cardozo Law Review! Regardless of
when the SEC first became obsolete, if it is obsolete now, let's get
rid of it.
3 David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1765, 1765 (1995).
4 See id. at 1779 ("The SEC is one important reason why the securities industry is in so
much better shape than the other financial service industries.").
5 See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MOTvrr. Sci. 3 (1971).
6 Ratner, supra note 3, at 1766.
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In a similarly self-revealing vein, Ratner repeats the old and
hollow argument that the SEC is needed so long as there is fraud in
the investment business. He notes that it is "[i]nteresting to see
how many of the investment scams of recent years have been al-
most identical with the scams of fifty or sixty years ago."7 That's
right, David. And if the SEC still hasn't figured out how to put an
end to these scams, why should we give them another sixty years?
It's not exactly as though the agency operates at zero cost to the
public.
Ratner goes on to assert that
the SEC's function is not to make sure that information about
issuers is disseminated quickly-that function is performed by
the prompt disclosure rules of the stock exchange and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")-but to en-
sure that there is a body of reliable and consistent information
available to enable the "market professionals" to make their
analyses.8
But a mere two paragraphs later Ratner acknowledges that these
market professionals were of no use "to the thousands of investors
in bond funds who have suffered substantial losses because their
'sophisticated intermediaries' were speculating with highly lever-
aged derivative instruments."9 Again, it would appear that Ratner
is acknowledging that the SEC is failing to do the job he asserts
that it was supposed to do. Isn't sixty years of failure long enough?
It's simply impossible that a firm in the private sector that failed to
offer a successful product over a sixty-year period could survive.
And the Ratner rejoinder contains that usual fundamental er-
ror committed by apologists for the SEC. Ratner asserts, without
any support whatsoever, that mandatory disclosure is necessary to
ensure that firms will issue reliable and consistent information
about themselves. There are three flaws in this analysis. First, it
ignores the fundamental fact that raising capital is costly. Investors
demand to be compensated for the risks they bear in buying securi-
ties. Firms can reduce their capital costs by making disclosures.
The antifraud rules serve as the mechanism by which the common
law makes such disclosure credible: if the firm issuing the securities
is lying, the remedy is a common-law action for fraud. The capital
markets will punish firms that attempt to "hide" from analysis by
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1767.
9 Id. at 1768.
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declining to make disclosures by assuming the worst and imposing
higher capital costs on such firms.
So much for mandatory disclosure of public offerings. As far
as ongoing disclosure goes, it is difficult to credit the argument that
the SEC plays a role that is even remotely similar to the role that
Ratner has in mind. For one thing, firms are entitled to remain
silent without fear of civil liability for making false and misleading
statements.' 0 It is only when they speak that they hold themselves
open to the quixotic demands of the SEC and the plaintiffs' class
action securities bar." It is impossible to conclude that this bizarre
system of incentives improves the quality, much less the quantity,
of corporate disclosure of information.
Finally, the argument that the SEC is necessary to ensure that
firms issue reliable and accurate information about themselves ig-
nores the fact that the SEC's mandatory disclosure regime poses
both costs as well as benefits to issuers and investors. For some
firms the costs are simply higher than the benefits. And there is no
reason to force these firms to undergo the costs of mandatory
disclosure.
To illustrate the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure,
imagine three firms that want to sell securities to the public. One
of these firms, called High Quality, Inc., is selling stock that is
worth one hundred cents per share. Another, Medium Quality,
Inc., is selling stock that is worth fifty cents per share, and the third,
Dog Meat, Inc., is trying to peddle stock that is worth only a penny.
Suppose further that we live in a "Ratnerian world" in which inves-
tors are entirely incapable of distinguishing, at the time they make
their investments, the high quality firm from the low quality and
medium quality firms absent disclosure. Suppose further that dis-
closure is not mandatory and that no firm voluntarily makes disclo-
sure. Investors will pay fifty cents per share for a portfolio
comprised of equal percentages of these three securities. Of course
this will mean that High Quality, Inc. will be forced to sell its
shares for fifty cents less than they are really worth, while Dog
Meat, Inc. will be able to sell its shares for fifty cents more than
they are worth. The result of this process is that Dog Meat will
rush to market with additional shares, while High Quality, Inc. will
withdraw its shares from the market. When investors adjust to this
10 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("Silence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-.").
11 See Junda Woo, Judges Show Skepticism in Class-Action Securities Cases, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 11, 1995, at B8.
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fact they will no longer be willing to pay even fifty cents for a port-
folio of securities in this market, since the odds will be overwhelm-
ing that their portfolio will consist of more shares of Dog Meat,
Inc. than of Medium Quality, Inc.12 When this happens, in a
Ratnerian world, even Medium Quality will withdraw its shares
from the market, as the market implodes. But in the real world,
high and medium quality firms will give the public quality assur-
ances that they are buying high, or at least medium quality goods.
In the absence of such assurance, investors will assume the worst.
The point of this simple exercise in the economics of disclo-
sure is twofold. First, I wish to observe that it is the higher-quality
firms that suffer from nondisclosure, and it is those firms that have
the greatest incentive to voluntarily disclose information about
themselves in order to permit investors to distinguish their firms
from lesser investments. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it
is worth noting that the firms of poor quality (the Dog Meats of the
world) have little incentive to disclose. Investors will assume the
worst about such firms if they do not make disclosures. Their as-
sumptions will only be confirmed when such disclosures are made.
Thus, the problem with mandatory disclosure is not that it drives
high quality firms from the marketplace, but that it drives low qual-
ity firms from the market place. For example, if disclosure costs
Dog Meat, Inc. more than a penny a share, the costs will be greater
than the total return from the investment. Thus, the economic ef-
fects of mandatory disclosure are borne by these low-end (or, more
accurately, high-risk) firms that are driven from the market be-
cause they must incur the high fixed costs of disclosure, without
any of the concomitant benefits in the form of lower costs of
capital.
Of course, as Ratner laboriously points out in his rejoinder,
sometimes low-end firms will attempt to pass themselves off as
high-end firms. But Ratner does not appear to understand that
there is not a scintilla of evidence that mandatory disclosure pre-
vents this any better than the common-law fraud rules that pre-
ceded the SEC.
12 George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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III. BURDENS OF PROOF IN EVALUATING THE SEC's
PERFORMANCE
This last point raises the issue of who should bear the burden
of proof in evaluating whether an administrative agency has be-
come obsolete or not. Interestingly, even Ratner appears to ac-
knowledge at least the possibility that an administrative agency will
become obsolete. He says that "[a]n agency, assuming it had a
valid purpose when it was created, becomes obsolete when the
problems that it was set up to deal with no longer exist, either be-
cause of technological changes, market changes, or other new de-
velopments."13 Thus, Ratner believes that support for the SEC
should continue as long as there are investment scams that sepa-
rate investors from their money.
In my view, Ratner's position on the issue of agency obsoles-
cence (despite the fact that he calls the concept of agency obsoles-
cence "pretty simple") is outlandish. A comparison to the private
sector illustrates the silliness of Ratner's point. The horse-and-
buggy was introduced as a means to address people's transporta-
tion needs. But nobody would say that there continues to be a
need for the horse-and-buggy because people continue to have
transportation needs. Rather, the introduction of new inventions
(such as automobiles and airplanes) has diminished, if not eradi-
cated, the need for the horse-and-buggy, despite the fact that the
general demand for transportation has increased dramatically.
In other words, the persistence of fraudulent practices in the
marketplace is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to
justify the continued existence of the SEC. Contrary to Ratner's
assertion, the continued existence of fraudulent practices is not suf-
ficient to justify the continued existence of the SEC because of the
possibility that the financial markets may have produced new
mechanisms and technologies for coping with risk generally and
with the risk of fraud in particular.
In fact, this was the basic point of my original article. New
financial theories, such as portfolio theory, the efficient capital
market hypothesis, and the capital asset pricing model all have
emerged since the SEC was created. Since the SEC was formed,
the Nobel Foundation has awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic
Science to Merton Miller, Franco Modigliani, George Stigler, and
James Tobin, among others. All these awards were, in large part,
for the advances made by these economists in showing how inves-
13 Ratner, supra note 3, at 1766.
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tors could eliminate the very risk that the SEC was created to re-
duce. In a nutshell, financial theory teaches that investors can
eliminate firm-specific risk-i.e., the risk associated with holding a
particular security-by holding a diversified portfolio of securities.
As Burton Malkiel has observed:
[u]nsystematic risk is the variability in stock prices (and there-
fore, in returns from stocks) that results from factors peculiar to
an individual company.... The whole point of portfolio theory
is that, to the extent that stocks don't move in tandem all the
time, variations in the returns from any one security will tend to
be washed away or smoothed out by complementary variation in
the returns from other securities....
The unsystematic part of the total risk is easily elimi-
nated by adequate diversification.
14
Thus, as I pointed out in the original article, modem financial the-
ory, increased competition in the financial services industry, and
new trading techniques and strategies for coping with risk indicate
that the basic functions of the SEC are being performed-better
and more cheaply-by the private sector.
But what about the argument that we still observe fraud in the
securities markets? Isn't that alone a sufficient basis to justify the
existence of the SEC? The issue is whether the activities of the
SEC produce benefits that are sufficient to offset the direct and
indirect costs of maintaining the SEC's regulatory system. These
costs include, of course, not only the filing fees imposed on compa-
nies by the SEC, but also the prodigious costs of complying with
the SEC's mandatory disclosure regime for firms that would not
otherwise voluntarily make such disclosures, as well as the cost to
firms of obtaining exemptions from registration.1 5 At a minimum,
the argument that the SEC imposes costs without concomitant ben-
efits for investors or markets must be taken seriously. Indeed,
even Ratner does not suggest that the SEC can be credited with
having caused a reduction in the incidence of fraud in U.S. securi-
ties markets. There is certainly no evidence that there is less fraud
in this market than in other securities markets around the world.
14 BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET: INCLUDING A LIFE-
CYcLE GUIDE TO PERSONAL INVESTING 230-31 (5th ed. 1990).
15 These costs include not only fees for investment bankers, lawyers, and accountants,
but also the additional borrowing costs borne by firms that are unable to make a public
offering of securities because of the costs imposed by complying with the registration re-
quirements of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.
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More generally, I would argue that Ratner's comment reflects
a general view that all social problems should be addressed by reg-
ulation: If there is fraud, the solution is to create an agency or pass
a regulation. If there is a problem with long distance phone service
(to use one of Ratner's examples), form an agency. His comment
reflects not even a glimmer of recognition of the fact that regula-
tion has not been particularly successful at solving economic or so-
cial problems. There is not even a glimmer of recognition of the
fact that the countries that have tried to regulate the most have
generally fared the worst. There is not even a glimmer of recogni-
tion of the fact that market forces have proven to be far more ef-
fective than government at generating information and producing
meaningful economic change.
Ratner ignores the lessons of the economic theory of regula-
tion, which teaches that politicians and regulators have poor incen-
tives to act to further the broad interests of the general public, and
very strong incentives to provide private benefits to well-organized
special interests that are able to galvanize into interest groups to
press for reform. Ratner assumes that the regulators, bureaucrats,
and politicians who control the SEC are motivated by altruism,
rather than by either political concerns or by the desire for per-
sonal or professional advancement.
Ratner's perspective on the ability of government (and the in-
ability of markets) to solve problems leads him to his rather clumsy
assumption that the mere existence of a problem justifies govern-
ment intervention. He seems to assume that only markets, not
governments, are imperfect. People doing cost-benefit analysis
need not apply for positions in the Ratnerian world of regulatory
nirvana.
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND THE GREATEST SECURITIES
MARKETS IN THE WORLD
Ratner is entirely correct to point out that the U.S. securities
markets are the envy of the world. The United States boasts the
broadest and deepest securities markets in the world. But is there
any support for the proposition that the SEC deserves credit for
this? The U.S. securities markets were quite robust before the cre-
ation of the SEC, so the best that can be said is that the SEC did
not retard the development of those markets. More importantly, a
variety of U.S. laws, from the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibits
commercial banks from directly competing with securities firms, to
the Bank Holding Company Act, which imposes severe activities
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restrictions on banks and, until this year, prohibited branch bank-
ing entirely, artificially kept U.S. banks weak relative to banks in
other countries. This, in turn, forced U.S. companies to turn to the
capital markets rather than to banks for their funding needs. It is
this phenomenon, far more than anything that the SEC has done,
that has caused U.S. securities markets to appear so impressive
alongside their European counterparts. But U.S. pride in the
strength of its capital markets must be tempered by recognition of
the truncated nature of U.S. banking markets, which are quite
weak by international standards. Indeed, there is only one U.S.
bank among the top twenty banks in the world. 6 And there are
more U.S. banks with offices in London than in New York. If the
SEC is to receive credit for the strength of U.S. securities markets,
shouldn't it also receive the blame for the weakness of the U.S.
commercial banking industry?
Along these lines, Ratner makes the strange assertion that the
SEC's insistence that foreign issuers must meet U.S. accounting
standards has not hurt the development of U.S. equity markets.17
The fact is that the New York Stock Exchange has lost considera-
ble business to London as a result of the SEC's baseless accounting
requirements. Ratner concedes that German companies have de-
clined to list in New York because of SEC rules. And, after all,
Germany is by far the largest economy in Europe, and one of the
top three economies in the world. Moreover, in recent years sub-
stantial trading volume has migrated from the stock exchanges in
Milan and Stockholm to London. This business might well have
gone to New York if the SEC would recognize the simple fact that
investors will adjust the prices they are willing to pay for securities
in order to make up for any perceived deficiencies in disclosure.
Ratner credits the SEC with fostering competition in the se-
curities market. This is simply not the case. Studies of the invest-
ment banking industry show that the industry is quite
concentrated. And the cartelization appears in precisely those ar-
eas which fall under the SEC's regulatory authority. For example,
the five largest underwriters of domestic corporate debt account
for almost seventy percent of the market, and the five largest un-
16 The World's 100 Largest Banks, INSTITIlONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1994, at 50 (New
York based Citicorp ranked ninth in total capital).
17 Ratner, supra note 3, at 1778.
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derwriters of public stock issues account for almost half of the
market. 18
Consistent with the interest-group theory of regulation, it ap-
pears clear that the SEC is acting to cartelize the industry. Its reg-
ulatory activities require firms to assume fixed costs which impose
disproportionate burdens both on newer and smaller firms, and on
rapidly growing firms, whose back-office operations may be slow to
catch up with the growth of their sales and trading operations. The
SEC's persistent concerns with "boiler room" operations have the
effect of stifling new entry into the securities markets.19
V. CONCLUSION
In his conclusion, Ratner opines that the problem with my Ar-
ticle, "as with much of the law review literature these days, is that it
proceeds from theoretical models, rather than from an examination
of the real world and a balancing of practical alternatives." 20 In
fact, my Article begins with a theoretical model merely to demon-
strate a point that Ratner himself concedes, namely that it is at
least conceivable that an administrative agency can become obso-
lete, and to develop criteria (which Ratner does not challenge) by
which we might determine when an agency has become obsolete.
From there I go on to discuss a number of specific examples from
the real world, including SEC Rule 19c-4, the executive compensa-
tion issue, the history of the SEC's turf wars with other agencies,
the SEC's position on loan participations, proxy reform, and the
penny stock market. Indeed, Ratner confines himself in his rejoin-
der to a discussion of the specific issues that I catalogued in my
original piece. His accusation that I do not discuss the real world is
simply false.
More to the point, at the time my piece was published, Ratner
probably was correct to point out that my Article failed to balance
practical alternatives. This assertion seemed correct because the
alternatives I was proposing (abolishing the SEC) hardly seemed
like a practical possibility in January 1994. But what is practical
should not be confused with what is desirable from a policy per-
spective. Moreover, things that seemed impractical in January of
18 Alan Greenspan, Statement Before the Senate Committee of Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs (Dec. 1, 1987), reprinted in 74 FED. RESERVE BULL. 91, 92-93 (1988).
19 See Diana B. Henriques, SEC Wins Big Round Against Stratton Oakmont Firm, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 12, 1995, at D2.
20 Ratner, supra note 3, at 1778.
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1994, seem a bit more possible in January of 1995. And who knows
what the political landscape will look like in 1996.
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